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Introduction 
In a representative democracy there are many different forces a politician deals with on a daily basis 
which can affect his decisions. As an elected representative a politician has the obligation to make 
decisions based on how this affects the population. Although certain forces may simply be beyond 
anyone’s control, there are also various organized groups which seek to actively influence the 
politician in the decision-making process. This raises the question how a politician should deal with 
these organized groups, which we normally call lobbyists. These organized groups have a right to be 
heard by politicians as they represent certain interests of the population, but the question still 
remains whether and how a politician should let this influence his decisions. Some parties in society 
do not try to influence, or perhaps cannot influence a politician at all, so if a politician lets lobbyists 
influence him this may create an imbalance in representation. In the 1992 European Parliament 
hearing on lobbying the critical side had three major accusations to lobbying. The first accusation was 
that lobbying creates an imbalance in decision-making: the industrial multinationals lobby the most 
which would imply the creation of an imbalance of decision-making leaving smaller groups such as 
workers, consumers and smaller enterprises at a disadvantage. The second accusation was that there 
seemed to be a lack of transparency in lobbying. Much of it takes place behind closed doors which 
makes it more difficult for competitors, the mass media and other officials to understand what is 
going on. The final accusation was that lobbyists use immoral practices such as document robbery, 
blackmail and bribery. 1 I will argue that the final accusation made here is not lobbying at all, 
although it is done by lobbyists. The reason that this accusation cannot be considered to be a form of 
lobbying is because in this case the lobbyist tries to influence the politician personally. A lobbyist 
should focus on the policies of the politician, and a politician should focus on how he represents his 
constituents, rather than focus on his personal gain. However, I will argue that the first two 
accusations are in fact rightly made to lobbying.  
                                                          
1 Rinus van Schendelen, Machiavelli in Brussels: The Art of Lobbying the EU. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2002), 279. 
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  In this thesis I will look at lobbying from a philosophical perspective. I will answer the 
question how lobbying influences democracy and how it affects democratic legitimacy. Philosophical 
theories of democracy are a very important part of political philosophy, and it is important for a 
philosophical theory of politics to understand what the organized external influences on democracy 
are. It is important to know what non-elected factors do in a democracy, and how this can be 
beneficial or detrimental to democratic legitimacy as well as democracy itself. The accusations of the 
European Parliament provide a good basis for us to tackle the problems caused by lobbying. The first 
accusation is that it can create imbalances in decision-making, the second accusation is that it can 
lead to a lack of transparency and the final accusation is that lobbyists use certain immoral practices, 
which would undermine the legitimacy of lobbying. 
  In order to answer the question how lobbying influences democracy and how it affects 
democratic legitimacy I will start by looking at the first problem with lobbying: that it can lead to an 
imbalance in democratic decision-making. If certain parties lobby more, or lobby more effectively, 
this can lead to a situation where some interests are represented better than others. In the first 
chapter I will look at this problem of lobbying. In order to come to a good understanding of this 
problem I will first discuss different types of democracy and what the important features of a 
democracy are. I will also discuss what the requirements of democracy are. For instance, how does a 
representative democracy differ from a deliberative democracy? Firstly I will focus on representative 
democracy as understood by Nadia Urbinati and Mark Warren, as well as how it is understood by 
Hanna Pitkin. Secondly I will discuss deliberative democracy as it is understood by Amy Gutmann and 
Dennis Thompson, before moving on to how Joshua Cohen understands deliberative democracy. 
Following this, in the third part, I will focus on the requirements of democracy. I will argue that these 
requirements are vital to ensure a good democracy, regardless of which theory is supported. The 
requirements are participation of citizens in government, freedom of speech, publicity of 
government, and accountability of the government to the people. It is also important to find out 
exactly what we mean by lobbying; this will be discussed in the fourth part. In order to gain a better 
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understanding of lobbying, I will discuss the effect lobbying had on the founding and changing of the 
Freedom of Information Act in the United States. In the fifth part I will discuss one of the problems of 
lobbying, namely that lobbyists use immoral practices to achieve their goals. I will argue that these 
practices are often mistaken for lobbying, but that they are strictly speaking not lobbying. It is 
important to understand what lobbying is not, so that you gain a better understanding of what 
constitutes lobbying. However, since the problems we associate with lobbyists play an important role 
in discussions about lobbying, we must consider these problems as well.  
  In the second chapter I will focus on the second major problem of lobbying: that it can lead 
to more secrecy in the government. One of the most important factors in theories of democracy is 
the notion of secrecy and the idea of publicity. It is important for a government to be open towards 
the public in a democracy. In fact, publicity is one of the requirements for democracy. Publicity and 
secrecy also play important roles in lobbying and the various problems surrounding lobbying. 
Lobbying can in fact lead to more secrecy, which as I will explain is not beneficial for a democracy. In 
order to explain this I will firstly discuss governmental secrecy, and how governmental secrecy affects 
democracy. Secrecy is generally seen as problematic for a democracy because it can lead to a system 
of government where the government is not accessible to the population. However, a certain 
measure of secrecy may be required in some cases in order to allow the government to continue to 
work effectively. In the second part of this chapter we will look at the concepts of deep secrecy and 
shallow secrecy in order to come to a better understanding of secrecy. These concepts distinguish 
between two different kinds of secrecy. They maintain that there is a difference between secrecy 
where information is simply not disclosed to the population and secrecy where the population is not 
even aware of certain secrets. Although governmental secrecy may be problematic for a democracy, 
there may be certain cases where governmental secrecy is justified. This will be discussed in the third 
part. After this in the fourth and final part I will look at what kind of influence lobbying has on 
secrecy, whether it leads to acceptable secrets or whether this constitutes a negative factor for 
democracy. 
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  However, in spite of these negative aspects of lobbying there are certainly also aspects of 
lobbying which have a positive influence on the government, democracy, and democratic legitimacy. 
These positive aspects are the focus of chapter 3. The first reason lobbying can be positive for the 
government is because it allows for an exchange of information between politicians and external 
parties. This means that governments can ask companies and groups of citizens for their opinions on 
certain policies. This can lead to improved policies as well as better government effectiveness overall, 
because the government can ask certain expert opinions. It can also lead to better representation by 
allowing for more information about the opinion of the population, thereby helping politicians be 
better representatives. This ties into the second positive aspect, namely that lobbying can lead to 
better representation by politicians. The reason for this is that citizens can talk to government 
officials directly, which makes sure that citizens are more actively involved in their government. 
Obviously this is very positive for a democracy that seeks to represent the interests of the population 
as best as it can. Lobbying allows for representation to be better implemented in a democracy by 
having the politicians listen to voices from the population. A democratic government should always 
strive to represent the interests of the population as best as it can. A third positive aspect is 
increased publicity. Lobbying can only work if there is a certain measure of publicity, therefore 
lobbyists would try to make sure that a certain measure of publicity is maintained, which is obviously 
beneficial for democracy as well. In other words, lobbying is not without its merits.  
 Finally, in chapter 4, we will discuss possible solutions to the problems of lobbying, namely 
imbalance of influence and secrecy in democratic government. It is important that when you attempt 
to solve the problem of lobbying the positive aspects of lobbying are maintained. The first solution 
we will discuss states that publicity in the government remains a strong way to counter many of the 
problems of lobbying. One way to ensure publicity is to enact a mandatory lobby register. This makes 
sure that the people know who exactly is lobbying and for what they are lobbying. The second way to 
solve the problems of lobbying is by turning towards a more deliberative mode of democracy. This 
means that the people are more inclined to deliberate about certain problems. This can lead to a 
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better representation for the people, while tackling the various problems of lobbying. By turning 
more towards deliberative democracy various problems can be solved, because it is necessary for a 
deliberative democracy to ensure publicity and accountability. In other words, there can be no 
deliberative democracy without publicity and accountability, which would ensure that certain 
problems of lobbying are minimized.  
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Chapter 1: Lobbying and democratic imbalance 
Introduction 
In a democracy there are always various forces at work that influence the direction of the decision-
making process. This can be the electorate who choose other politicians, changes in political parties, 
an external factor to the political process, or something else entirely. Although these external forces 
cannot always be controlled or organized, there are certain forces that organize themselves in such a 
manner that is specifically designed to influence politicians and policy. These external forces are also 
known as lobbyists. There are various problems that can come from the organized external 
influences on democracy. In this chapter I will discuss one of the major problems, namely that these 
forces can disturb democratic balance. In a democracy the voice of every citizen should be heard as 
much as every other citizen, but lobbying can have the effect that certain interests are weighed more 
heavily than others. If some voices or interests are listened to more than others in politics this is of 
course not a positive thing for a democracy. For example, there might be big corporations who have 
the means and the knowledge to influence politics more heavily and effectively than others. In order 
to come to a good understanding of this problem of lobbying I will first discuss different forms of 
democracy and how these forms of democracy deal with the influence of the population. We will 
look at the notion of representation as understood by Nadia Urbinati and Mark Warren, followed by 
how representation is understood by Hanna Pitkin. Once we have a clear understanding of 
representation we can move on to another understanding of democracy entirely, namely 
deliberative democracy. In order to come to a good understanding of deliberative democracy I will 
discuss deliberative democracy as understood by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, before 
moving on to how Joshua Cohen understands deliberative democracy. I will conclude from these 
theories what the requirements of democracy are. I will argue that these requirements are 
necessary, regardless of which theory of democracy is used. I will then move on to what we consider 
to be lobbying. In order to explain the phenomenon of lobbying I will begin by explaining exactly 
what lobbying entails, who lobbies, and how lobbying is done. I will then give an example of how 
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lobbying can shape various legislative procedures by discussing the Freedom of Information Act and 
how lobbying contributed to its implementation as well as the restrictions that followed it. Following 
this, I will discuss what is often thought to be lobbying, but is actually not lobbying at all. Many 
people believe that certain activities fall under lobbying when these activities are not strictly 
speaking lobbying. I will argue that what many people hold to be lobbying is actually a form of 
personal corruption of the politician, not lobbying at all. However, I will argue that it is still important 
to understand these accusations since they are important in the discussion surrounding lobbying. 
Finally, I will discuss how lobbying can have a negative influence on democracy. Lobbying can lead to 
democratic imbalance because it can ensure a system where some actors have more influence than 
others. This means that some interests are weighed more heavily than others. Before we can move 
on to discuss the problems of lobbying in more detail, we must first look at how democracy may be 
organized, and what the important aspects of democracy are. 
 
Representation 
There are many theories of democracy which all have various ways of organizing the relation 
between the people and their representatives. Theories of democracy range from relying heavily on 
the consensus of the population, such as deliberative democracy, to relying more on the indirect 
consensus of the population, such as liberal democracy, or representative democracy. In order to 
gain a better understanding we will first look at how political representation can be organized in 
democracy. I will start by discussing the notion of representation as understood by Urbinati and 
Warren, then I will move on to how representation is understood by Pitkin. 
  In a liberal democracy people have the right to choose their government while retaining their 
liberties and their rights. According to Mill, one of the most influential authors on liberal democracy, 
the most important liberties to protect are the freedoms of conscience, thought and feeling, holding 
and expressing opinions, pursuing one’s life plans, and combining with others for any (non-malicious) 
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purpose.2 These liberties only affect those who enjoy them, and should not be interfered with by 
others, for example the state. These ideals are often respected in representative democracy, a 
theory of democracy where people choose who will represent their interests. Democracy is almost 
always organized in a representative manner. Political representation can be shaped in different 
ways. It can be the representation of the population’s interests, the representation of the population 
as if they were making the choices themselves, or some other form of representation. In other 
words, a representative might be a trustee of the population’s interests, a representative might be a 
delegate who decides on what the population says they want, or something else. Regarding the idea 
of representation as trust, here the population entrusts their interests to the elected.3 Urbinati and 
Warren define representation as having four features. The first feature is that representation is 
understood as a principal-agent relationship, meaning that the voters, or principals, elect agents to 
stand for and act on their interests and opinions. This entails that the sources of legitimate power are 
separated from the exercise of this power. The second feature of electoral representation is that the 
sovereignty of the people is identified with state power. The third feature is that electoral 
mechanisms have a measure of responsiveness to the people they represent. This can also be done 
through political parties who speak in the name of the people. The final feature is that there is a 
certain measure of political equality in the electoral representation.4 This manner of representation 
still has certain complexities of course. How votes are worked into representation, how agendas are 
set, and how public opinion is formed is all part of the system of representative democracy. Urbinati 
and Warren also discuss representation with regard to democracy. As they state: “If democratic 
representation is to be understood as more than a division of labour between political elites and 
citizens, we need to understand representation as an intrinsic part of what makes democracy 
possible.”5 Again they discuss democratic responsiveness, which according to them includes the 
                                                          
2 Frank Cunningham, Theories of Democracy, (London: Routledge publishing, 2002), 28. 
3 Nadia Urbinati and Mark E. Warren, “The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory,” 
Annual Review of Political Science 11, no. 1 (2008): 400, doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053006.190533. 
4 Ibid., 389. 
5 Ibid., 395.  
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authorization of a representative by those who are represented, as well as the accountability of 
representatives to those represented.6 Representatives are elected in order to do certain things, and 
when they fail at their jobs they fail to fulfil an obligation. One might say that this is an ethical 
obligation of a representative. There seems to be a relationship between representation and 
responsibility, and representation also seems to be related to rights.7 This means that accountability 
is inherent in representation; a representative is someone who will have to answer for what he does 
to another, namely those he represents. Here the meaning of representative democracy is that the 
government is held responsible to the society as a whole, for example by holding them accountable 
at periodic elections.8 We can use this view of accountability to distinguish between ‘real’ 
representation and ‘fraudulent’ representation.9 Genuine representation exists only where there is 
accountability towards the represented, where there are certain controls of the representatives. As 
Pitkin states, accountability theorists aim to show that true representation entails responsiveness to 
the represented.10 For a representative it might be said that he should act as if he would eventually 
have to account for his actions.11 
  The question of accountability goes back in part to the question of representation. If a 
politician makes a decision based on the interests of his constituents, is he then accountable to 
others? Does a politician for instance have a responsibility to uphold certain basic human rights, even 
in the face of backlash from his constituents? Does he have a responsibility to future generations, or 
teenagers who do not have the right to vote? As Urbinati and Warren state: accountability is one of 
the most important aspects of representative democracy. As we have mentioned this is a feature of 
responsiveness to the people they represent. After all, if a politician does not abide by public opinion 
there are ways in which the population can respond to that politician, for instance by not re-electing 
                                                          
6 Ibid., 396.  
7 Hanna Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 54-55.  
8 Ibid., 56.  
9 Ibid., 57.  
10 Ibid., 113. 
11 Ibid., 119; cf. Justus Beijk, “Accountability and Democracy: The Notion of Accountability Explored” 
(unpublished, manuscript, June 24, 2016), Microsoft Word file. 
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that politician. In a representative democracy it is required that representative politicians can be held 
accountable for their actions as representatives. It has been said that democratic responsiveness 
includes authorization of a representative by those who would be represented, and accountability of 
the representative to those represented.12 If they are not representing our interests as we would like, 
we can hold them accountable for their actions by not re-electing them, or perhaps even by 
impeaching them. Furthermore, one might argue that a politician does not just owe an amount of 
accountability to the electoral constituents but also to their moral constituents. This can include 
citizens in other nations, groups of disadvantaged citizens, and citizens yet to be born.13  
  Not only does this pose a challenge to representative democracy, it also poses a big challenge 
to another theory of democracy, namely deliberative democracy. Deliberative democracy is based on 
the idea that citizens should have an active deliberation in their government in order for there to be 
legitimacy, and that the government should listen to the citizens. But for some moral constituents 
like unborn citizens it is simply impossible to deliberate. A measure of accountability might still be 
saved however, since it is by no means the case that representatives should attend only to the 
interests of those who elect them.14 Even still, politicians could appeal to moral accountability to 
their constituents. They might attempt to convince the electorate that others are worth taking into 
account as well, the moral constituents.  
 
Deliberative democracy 
Now that we have an understanding of representative democracy and how accountability features in 
this system we can move on to deliberative democracy. Deliberative democracy is a system of 
democracy where there is a strong focus on the active participation and deliberation of the public. 
Deliberation is central to the decision-making of this type of democracy. Or as Gutmann and 
                                                          
12 Urbinati and Warren, “The Concept of Representation,” 396. 
13 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1996), 145-146. 
14 Ibid., 146. 
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Thompson understand the concept of deliberative democracy: “The core idea is simple: when 
citizens or their representatives disagree morally, they should continue to reason together to reach 
mutually acceptable decisions.”15 Although this already takes place to a certain degree in most 
conceptions of democracy, deliberative democracy asks that deliberation is done more consistently. 
It is important to note that deliberative democracy does not exclude representation. Deliberation 
amongst citizens as well as between citizens and the government takes a central place in the theory, 
but in deliberative democracy representation would still be required. The three main principles 
Gutmann and Thompson maintain for deliberative democracy are reciprocity, publicity, and 
accountability. These principles express the conditions of deliberation.16 By reciprocity is meant the 
idea that the population seeks to find solutions which are acceptable to all parties. If this is not the 
starting point of deliberation it becomes impossible to reach a consensus. Publicity is required 
because it motivates people to deliberate and allows people to fully grasp what they are deliberating 
about. It is also a requirement for accountability. After all, if a policy is not known to the public it 
becomes impossible to hold the politicians accountable for their actions. There are also three 
substantive principles that govern the content of deliberation in the theory of Gutmann and 
Thompson: basic liberty, basic opportunity, and fair opportunity.17 In fact, these substantive 
principles are all constitutional principles of a deliberative democracy. This means that these are 
standards which must not be violated in the making of public policy serving as self-constraints.18 
Basic liberty entails the idea that everyone should have a certain amount of sovereignty over 
themselves, their mind and their body.19 Basic opportunity refers to the distribution of goods that 
enable people to live a decent life and have certain opportunities. Fair opportunity on the other hand 
refers to the distribution of goods on the basis of qualifications.20  
                                                          
15 Ibid., 1. 
16 Ibid., 7-8. 
17 Ibid., 8. 
18 Ibid., 199. 
19 Ibid., 230. 
20 Ibid., 9. 
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 Now that we have a better understanding of deliberative democracy as understood by 
Gutmann and Thompson, an important aspect to expand on is how accountability features in their 
theory of deliberative democracy. After all, this is one of the principles of deliberation. It might 
appear as though deliberative democracy does not fully incorporate accountability, because this 
would in part entail that the citizens could be held accountable to themselves. But Gutmann and 
Thompson understand it differently, each is accountable to all.21 By this it is meant that people, 
citizens as well as officials, try to justify their decisions to all the affected. In other words, in a 
deliberative democracy representatives are required to do more to justify their choices. It is not the 
case that they are only there to win elections or only there to respect certain rights. In a deliberative 
democracy representatives are expected to justify their actions, they give reasons that can be 
accepted by those who are to be bound by the laws and policies.22 But on the other hand, citizens 
should also try to justify their decisions to the affected; they should give their reasons for their 
decisions.  
  In order to attain a more complete understanding of deliberative democracy we now turn to 
the theory of Joshua Cohen, who maintains a different notion of deliberative democracy. As Cohen 
describes, a deliberative democracy is an association whose affairs are governed by the public 
deliberation of its members.23 Deliberative democracy is rooted in the ideal of a democratic 
association in which the justification of the terms and conditions of association proceeds through 
public argument and reasoning among equal citizens.24 Deliberative democracy searches for forms of 
representation that support an interaction between citizens and legislative and political bodies, 
based on argumentation. Gutmann and Thompson have posited that deliberative democracy may 
include a combination between representative and direct democracy.25 According to Cohen the 
                                                          
21 Ibid., 128. 
22 Ibid., 129. 
23 Joshua Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,” in The Good Polity, ed. Alan Hamlin and Philip 
Pettit, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 17.  
24 Ibid., 21. 
25 Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, 131. 
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formal conception of deliberative democracy has five main features. The first feature is that a 
deliberative democracy is an ongoing and independent association, whose members expect it to 
continue into the indefinite future. The second feature is that the members of this association share 
the view that the correct terms of association provide a framework for, or are the results of their 
deliberation. Thirdly, it is required that a deliberative democracy is a pluralistic association. This 
means that the members have diverse preferences, convictions and ideals concerning the conduct of 
their own lives. While they share a commitment to the deliberative resolution of problems of 
collective choice, they also have divergent aims, preferences, and convictions. The fourth feature 
entails that the members of a democratic association see the deliberative procedures as the source 
of legitimacy. Finally, the members of the deliberative society recognize one another as having the 
deliberative capacities required for entering into an exchange of reasons and for acting on the result 
of such reasoning.26  
  But for a democracy it is important not only to understand the formal requirements. We 
must also discuss the procedure of deliberative democracy. Cohen is proposing an ideal scheme of 
deliberation; he focusses on how deliberative procedures should proceed. An ideal scheme of 
deliberation means that it might not necessarily be practical. However, his aim is to make the 
conditions for deliberative decision-making explicit, and to highlight the properties that a democratic 
institution should try to embody as much as possible. For this procedure there are four general 
aspects of deliberative procedure which will be discussed. However, the overarching theme is still 
that outcomes are democratically legitimate if they could be the result of an agreement among 
equals which is free and reasoned, for instance between the government and the people. This 
agreement being free and reasoned can also be described as deliberative. The ideal deliberative 
procedure is formed on the basis of this principle.27 The first aspect of a deliberative procedure of 
democracy as described by Cohen is that in deliberation participants think of themselves bound only 
                                                          
26 Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,” 21. 
27 Ibid., 22. 
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by the results of their deliberation. The idea that their deliberations should not be limited by a 
certain authority is a requirement for deliberation. Because people should think of themselves as 
only bound by their deliberations, we can say that the people should act based on the results of their 
deliberation. The reason for this is that in a deliberative democracy the fact that certain decisions are 
arrived at through deliberation is sufficient reason to comply with it. The second aspect of 
deliberative procedure is that deliberation should be reasoned rationally. This means that the parties 
in a democracy are required to give their reasons for advancing, supporting, or criticizing proposals. 
Cohen even goes so far as to say that proposals may be rejected if they are not defended with 
acceptable reasons, even if it is possible that they be defended by acceptable reasons. The third 
aspect of the ideal procedure is that participants in deliberation should be equal. This can be applied 
to deliberations between citizens, as well as deliberations between the government and citizens. The 
people that deliberate should be equal in a formal way as well as being substantively equal. By being 
formally equal it is meant that everyone has an equal standing in the deliberative process. Everyone 
can put issues on the agenda, propose solutions, and criticize. By being substantively equal it is 
meant that citizens are not limited by external forces on the deliberative process. This means that 
the current distribution of resources should not limit their deliberations. Participants should not be 
bound, or have the idea that they are bound in their deliberations by some existing system of rights 
of others or themselves. The exception to this idea is that people can be bound if this establishes the 
framework of deliberation. The fourth and final aspect is that the aim of deliberation should be a 
rationally motivated consensus. If a consensus cannot be reached, the deliberation should conclude 
with voting and proceed with a form of majority rule. 28 
 
Requirements for democracy 
Now that we have discussed representative democracy and deliberative democracy we can move on 
to which parts of these theories are required in order to maintain a democratic form of government, 
                                                          
28 Ibid., 22-23; cf. Beijk, “Accountability and Democracy”. 
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regardless of which theory is being used. Although the theories of democracy we discussed are very 
different and have various ways of interpreting democracy and the aforementioned values that come 
with it, there are important aspects which are required to ensure a democratic form of government. 
In this part we will focus on these aspects before moving on to the effect lobbying has on some of 
these aspects of democracy. I will argue that the most basic requirements for democracy include a 
form of government where citizens at least can participate in government, have freedom of speech, 
where the government is required to have publicity, and where there is accountability of politicians 
to the citizens. If these requirements are not met, both representative and deliberative forms of 
democracy would be unattainable. 
  Firstly, participation is required for a democracy so that citizens can influence governmental 
decision-making. Participation can take the form of suffrage, since it is a very clear way to determine 
the will of the people. This of course includes choosing the politicians in a representative democracy. 
This is where a part of the justification for representative democracy comes from, since state power 
gets its justification from the sovereignty of the people. If this were not present there would be no 
way for the citizens to influence politics, and there could be no democracy.  
  Freedom of speech is required so that citizens can express their opinions about the 
government. If there would be no freedom of speech it would be very hard for citizens to organize 
themselves in a way that could influence politics. This would also get in the way of the participation 
of citizens, which we have just discussed. If there would be no freedom of speech it would be very 
difficult to discuss policies and come to a reasonable conclusion about the policies of the 
government. Along with freedom of speech comes freedom of press, which is a requirement for 
democracy as well because again, if this were not in place, citizens could not make an informed 
decision about their government. The reason for this is that the press organizes knowledge about the 
government and researches new information concerning the government. This allows citizens to 
inform themselves better about the government. If citizens are unable to inform themselves they are 
not able to judge how their government has made policies. Obviously citizens should be able to make 
16 
 
judgments about their government, otherwise it could not function as a democracy.  
  The third requirement is publicity of the government. This requirement was explicitly named 
by Gutmann and Thompson in their requirements for deliberative democracy. Publicity entails that 
the government is required to make the reasons behind political actions public, as well as to make 
information necessary to assess those reasons public.29 Again, this is required so that the citizens can 
make an informed decision about their government. Although the government is required to have 
publicity, there are cases where the government is allowed to keep certain pieces of information 
from the public. We will discuss governmental secrecy in further detail in Chapter 2.  
  Something which is closely related to publicity and which is essential for an effective 
government and an effective democracy is the idea of political accountability. Again, this was 
explicitly named as a requirement by Gutmann and Thompson. The idea of accountability entails that 
a politician should be able to be held responsible for his political decisions and his actions during the 
time he was an elected representative. If a politician has not done a good job or simply has not 
carried out his promised policies, the citizens of a state have the right not to re-elect him, hold him 
accountable through impeachment, or some other form of accountability. In order for this important 
part of democracy to function effectively a certain measure of publicity is required from the 
government. From this we can clearly see that secrecy is also connected with accountability; 
democracy requires publicity in order for there to be accountability. We will find that lobbying can 
have a negative impact on democracy because it interferes with publicity, and thus also with 
accountability. But before we can move on to what kind of effect lobbying has on these requirements 
of democracy, we will first need to discuss lobbying itself.  
 
What is lobbying? 
Lobbying is becoming more and more accepted in the European Union as a part of the political 
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spectrum.30 Lobbying has the reputation of being very secretive and a negative factor on democracy, 
and even democratic legitimacy. As lobbying is becoming a more important factor in the European 
Union, as well as in many other political spheres, it is important to understand exactly what we mean 
by lobbying and how it affects democracy. In other words, we must first consider what exactly we 
mean by lobbying, what constitutes a lobby group, and why politicians cooperate with lobbyists to 
begin with. Lobbying is often criticised because of its damaging effects on democratic functioning. 
One of the major problems which is often mentioned is that lobbying can lead to an imbalance in 
decision-making. But before we can come to an understanding of the effects of lobbying on 
democracy, we need to have a clear understanding of what we mean when we talk about lobbying 
itself.  
  Generally we think of lobbying as something only done by big corporations in order to 
influence politicians, but it is broader than that. Broadly speaking, lobbying is the attempted or 
successful influence of political decisions through interested representatives. What determines 
interest group influence is a central question in the study of politics.31 The act of lobbying is carried 
out by a lobby group. There are three factors which must be present to define an actor as a lobby 
group: a certain amount of organization, political interests, and private status.32 It is important to 
note that these groups are not democratically elected. They are in fact an outside influence on 
elected politicians or civil servants. There are many different interest groups and a wide variety of 
actors who have a certain amount of organization and have political interest without striving for 
public office. This definition applies to employers’ associations, trade unions, environmental groups, 
companies, and professional associations. All these can be considered lobby groups.  
  For influence to be considered lobbying the influence must be intentional, use 
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communication to achieve this influence, and be targeted at legislative or executive bodies.33 This 
means lobbying can be focussed on politicians, but also on administrative bodies. This political 
interaction is in part an exchange of information, which is an important factor in lobbying as well. For 
the European Union lobbying can often be conceptualized as an exchange relationship in which the 
European institutions trade influence for information, citizen support, and economic power. It is 
important to understand that lobbying is always organized in such a way that it can wield some 
influence. A group without organization which nonetheless is capable of influencing politicians, 
however, cannot be considered a lobby group. For example, if there are various riots that disturb the 
peace this may have a lot of influence on policy. Politicians may increase funding for law 
enforcement, or take action in order to prevent social injustice so riots are less frequent. But 
although an unorganized group may still influence politics, we are looking at how organized groups 
can influence politics. Another important aspect of lobbying is the exchange of information. For 
lobbyists this is the most important way to influence politicians. Lobbyists are often called to 
politicians to provide technical information on certain subjects. Lobbyists can then give the 
information from a certain perspective.34 It is then up to the politician to make a decision based on 
the information provided. Finally, it is vital to note that although a lobbyist often tries to influence a 
politician, he does so by influencing policy, not by influencing the politician directly. This means that 
when a lobbyist tries to bribe, blackmail, or pressure a politician in any way by directly influencing his 
person, he is not taking part in lobbying strictly speaking. In this case he is trying to influence a 
politician based on personal gain. This also extends to matters of personal gain which are sometimes 
legal, such as accepting campaign contributions or benefiting certain corporations in the hope of a 
career after politics. This last example is also known as the revolving door. The reason that a 
politician should not make decisions based on his own benefit is that representative politicians 
should try to make decisions on the basis of the representation of the electorate. If he makes 
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decisions not based on how this affects the population but how it affects him personally, he is not 
properly representing the population. We can call this illegitimate means of influence.  
  In order for a lobby to be successful a politician needs to want to work together with the 
lobbyists. There are a number of reasons that explain why and in what way a politician may 
cooperate with lobbyists. Many of these reasons for the cooperation with lobbyists come from the 
fact that politicians want to be re-elected. It is important to note that this does not necessarily 
constitute a negative aspect of democracy. For instance, a politician may want to be re-elected 
because he represents the interests of the population well. According to Moshe Cohen-Eliya and 
Yoav Hammer, the reason why politicians cooperate with lobbyists can be explained in three 
different ways. Lobbying can be seen as an exchange of various things between lobbyist and 
politician, it can be seen as a persuasion, or lobbying can be seen as a legislative subsidy, where 
lobbyists help to supply and edit complex information.35 When lobbying is viewed as an exchange we 
are referring to voter support or money, which politicians need for re-election. Lobbying can provide 
both of these. Voter support can be provided by the lobby group if the lobbying group has a large 
number of supporters, this can make sure the politician is making a decision which has voter support 
behind it. In terms of the financial exchanges, we are referring to donations made by lobbyists to an 
election campaign.36 As we have discussed, this can be of questionable status, but it is generally 
considered to be a form of lobbying. The lobbyist may also provide information about voter 
preferences, which can be necessary for the politician to make a good decision as a representative. 
This can be seen as persuasion. In other words, persuasion can also take the form of convincing the 
politician it is in the general interest that certain decisions are made by the politician. The final 
reason politicians may work together with lobbyists is because lobbying can function as a legislative 
subsidy. This theory holds that the information provided by lobbyists often takes the form of edited 
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complex information. This can fill the information gaps for politicians.37 
  An example of how lobbying works can be found in the way the Freedom of Information Act 
was founded and how it changed throughout the years. The Freedom of Information act allows 
people to request information from the US government which is generally not open to the public. It 
was first created to give people more trust in their government, since many people were becoming 
increasingly sceptical of the US government after the Vietnam War. There was also a lobby to 
support the act from various trade group members. They were asked if the Freedom of Information 
Act would “afford adequate protection with respect to information given the government by 
business,” to which the responses were affirmative.38 However, since then business and industry 
representatives, which are the largest groups making use of this act, have lobbied for changes in the 
Freedom of Information Act.39 The US government has certain provisions which regulate what can 
and cannot be disclosed. One of these exceptions to the freedom of information is the exception for 
confidential business information. This exception was implemented after a representative of a 
company testified before congress that such an example should be made.40 Multiple associations 
were involved in shaping the freedom of information act and its exemptions. For example, to 
persuade the government that it was becoming too lenient in the granting of requests of the act. The 
associations argued that the openness of the government was hurting business interests. According 
to them it was causing economic harm through industrial espionage.41 Businesses have been heavily 
involved in the setting of agenda’s relating to the Freedom of Information Act. Although the Freedom 
of Information Act was founded through lobbying, the influence of lobbyists eventually led to a less 
open Freedom of Information act, which meant less information about businesses being available to 
                                                          
37 Ibid., 271. 
38 Jeannine E. Relly and Carol B. Schwalbe, “How business lobby networks shaped the U.S. Freedom of 
Information Act: An examination of 60 years of congressional testimony,” Government Information Quarterly, 
33, no. 3 (July 2016), 3, doi: 10.1016/j.giq.2016.05.002. 
39 Ibid., 2. 
40 Ibid., 3. 
41 Ibid., 3-4.  
21 
 
the public.42 This raises certain questions as to whether lobbying, and citizen participation in general 
perhaps, is positive or negative when it comes to things like democratic legitimacy, governmental 
secrecy etc.  
 
Problems we associate with lobbying 
As mentioned before, a lot of problems which can be caused by lobbyists do not actually have 
anything to do with lobbying strictly speaking. One of the accusations of the European Parliament 
was that lobbyists use immoral practices such as document robbery, blackmail, and bribery. I will 
argue that this is not lobbying strictly speaking. Lobbying is the act of persuading a political actor 
through certain means, but it is always focussed on the political actor, on the policies. If a lobbyist 
tries to influence a political actor by focussing on the person of the political actor, this is not lobbying 
in fact. This type of influence takes the form of personal corruption. Personal corruption is the effort 
of the lobbyists or any other group to try to get the politician not to act on the basis of the general 
interest but on the basis of his own interest. In the past, it has been the case that civil servants have 
either been pressurized, have been attempted to be blackmailed, or have experienced other negative 
ways of persuasion.43 These cases carry with it certain normative implications. If public policy is 
biased in favour of some interests while others are constantly losing, the democratic legitimacy is 
undermined. We saw these accusations in the hearing of the European parliament, where the critical 
side of a hearing claimed that lobbying creates an imbalance in decision-making, that it secondly 
lacks transparency, and finally that immoral practices are used by lobbyists. But although these 
accusations give an impression of lobbying, I will argue that these accusations do not strictly relate to 
lobbying. What I will argue is that the third accusation made in the European Parliament hearing is 
not lobbying at all, although it is done by lobbyists. However, I will argue that the first two 
accusations do in fact relate to lobbying. The reason that this accusation, namely lobbyists using 
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immoral practices, cannot be considered lobbying is because it is a form of personal corruption. This 
means the lobbyist tries to convince the politician not to look at certain issues from a representative 
aspect, but to look at these issues from a perspective of personal gain. He is no longer trying to 
represent anyone in this case; he is simply trying to achieve the biggest advantage he can for himself. 
Lobbying is an external influence of a non-elected party onto an elective party. Lobbying should focus 
on the political interests, not the personal interests of the politician. So when a lobby group tries to 
bribe, blackmail, bully, or try to influence a politician on personal grounds, this party is no longer 
involved in lobbying, strictly speaking. Of course, if you were to openly ask a lobby firm exactly what 
they do and exactly how they influence politicians they would not claim that they were involved in 
these illegal practices. Bribery, blackmail and bullying are obviously not legally allowed, but there are 
other types of personal gain which are allowed. For instance campaign financing by lobby groups, 
something which has been a source of protest in the United States, and the phenomenon of the 
revolving door. 
  The problem of the revolving door is one of the main problems caused by lobbying in a 
democracy. The revolving door refers to the fact that many politicians start working for a lobbying 
firm after their political career. It appears that this number has even increased the past few years, at 
least in the United States. This could entail a certain ‘business model’ for a political career, where 
politicians who leave their position can automatically get a job at a public affairs bureau if they have 
cooperated with their interests.44 It is possible that the lobby firm could promise certain positions if 
the politician makes certain decisions in line with the interests of certain companies. But it is also 
possible that the politician does so without explicitly making agreements with a lobbying firm. 
However, in both cases this is a matter of personal gain. The politician does not have the interests of 
the population in mind; he is making decisions on the bases of his personal gain. In this case, a 
lucrative career after politics. Obviously this is not a form of lobbying, but it is a factor that is relevant 
in lobbying which is why it is important to discuss that factor here.  
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  Another way in which politicians can be influenced, and which is also a generally allowed 
method of personal gain, is campaign financing. It is up for discussion whether campaign financing is 
a form of lobbying strictly speaking, but it is a factor which plays an important role in lobbying which 
is why it is important to discuss it here. Campaign financing often takes the form of the support of a 
political campaign by a lobby firm or someone else with a corporate interest. A campaign is generally 
the personal interest of a politician, and when an outside influence can promise that a politician has 
more to spend for his campaign this can be an effective method of influence. A company may 
promise funds for the campaign if a politician has the interests of the company in mind. This can 
obviously lead to a conflict of interest when it comes to the representation of the interests of the 
population. There is evidence to suggest that in the United States lobbying agencies influence the 
political agenda to have their issues prioritized.45 Many countries limit campaign financing in order to 
prevent this. Of course it can also be said that campaign financing can be done through grass-roots 
financial support by individuals. If this is the case then it would not constitute a problem for 
democratic legitimacy as much as when it is done by corporations. The reason for this is that 
individuals would find it more difficult to compete with the superior means of corporations. 
However, this would still constitute a problem for democratic legitimacy. The reason for this is that 
individuals with more means could influence politics more than the people who do not have as much 
money to invest in political campaigns. In a democracy every person has just as much to say as 
anyone else, and the idea that certain people with more means generally have more influence is of 
course at odds with this notion.  
 
Lobbying and the problem of democratic imbalance 
Now that we have a better understanding of representative and deliberative democracy as well as 
what lobbying is, we can turn towards the effects lobbying has on democracy. We have seen that 
there are four requirements for democracy, participation of the public in the government, freedom 
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of speech, publicity, and accountability. I have argued that if these requirements are not met this 
constitutes a fundamental problem for democracy. As discussed, one of the main concerns that 
people have with lobbying is the idea that it can disturb democratic legitimacy by giving some actors 
more influence than others. Lobbying can lead to an imbalance in representation and decision-
making. In fact, this aspect has been mentioned in a hearing of the European Parliament on the 
problems of lobbying. The critical side in the hearing stated that the dominant interest groups in 
society lobby the most. The critical side implied that this creates an imbalance in decision-making 
leading to a disadvantage for smaller interest groups such as workers, consumers and smaller 
enterprises.46 It is clear that this can constitute a problem for democracy, because in a democracy we 
expect everyone’s interest to be represented equally. Everyone should be represented as much as 
anyone else, regardless of money, power, or other factors. This is problematic for democracy 
because this undermines one of the requirements for democracy, namely participation. The way the 
people participate in a representative democracy is by electing representatives who will make 
decisions for the people. A representative either should make decisions based on the interests of the 
population, where he works as a trustee, or he should make decisions based on what choices the 
population themselves would make, where he works as a delegate.47 In other words, a politician has 
a responsibility as a representative to take the interests of the population into account. Lobbying can 
lead to an imbalance in the representation of these interests. This means that the way we use 
participation is undermined, since some participate more than others. The imbalance in 
representation through lobbying comes into play when some lobbies or influences on politicians are 
more efficiently run than others. If an oil company has more means and can organize itself in a better 
way it can obviously influence more politicians and be generally more effective. An environmental 
group might then be left behind which can lead to an imbalance in decision-making because 
politicians have been influenced more heavily by this oil company. This means that the democratic 
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interests are not evenly represented.  
  Another reason the imbalance in representation is problematic is because it interferes with 
the basic justification of government. The government gets its justification from the sovereignty of 
the people, and the government should act from this perspective. If politicians and lobbyists seek to 
disrupt the balance of democracy by letting a particular interest group exert more influence than 
others, this constitutes a conflict with the sovereignty of the people, the source of legitimacy. Of 
course everyone should have a voice in politics, including oil companies, but this does not mean they 
should be overrepresented, and have significantly more influence than others.  
 
Conclusion 
As we have seen lobbying can have a negative influence on democracy. There are various 
requirements which are essential for a democracy to function effectively and maintain democratic 
legitimacy. We can also see that there are various ways to interpret the concept of democracy and 
the will of the population. I have discussed representative democracy and deliberative democracy 
which have different interpretations of democracy. But despite various differences between the 
theories, there are certain requirements that must be met for a particular polity to be considered a 
democracy. These requirements are participation of the people in government, freedom of speech 
and freedom of press, publicity of the government, and accountability of the politician to the people. 
Knowing these important aspects of democracy the question raised what lobbying does to these 
aspects. Lobbying can be done in different ways, but as we have seen there are different ways one 
can persuade politicians, which are not strictly speaking ways of lobbying. But even if lobbyists stick 
to the familiar ways of lobbying which are legally allowed, lobbying can still have a negative impact 
on democracy. Lobbyists can influence politicians in such a way that they see their viewpoints as 
more important than others. This means that parties that have the means to hire more lobbyists or 
lobby more effectively have their voice heard more than other parties. Now that we have a better 
understanding of the ways public policy can be influenced by lobbying, in the next chapter we will 
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focus on the requirement of publicity in a democracy, secrecy in democracy, and the effect lobbying 
can have on secrecy.   
27 
 
Chapter 2: Secrecy in democracies and lobbying. 
Introduction 
In this chapter we will look at the second problem of lobbying for a democracy, namely that it can 
lead to more secrecy in government. Governmental secrecy is problematic for democracy, since it is 
required for people to have a clear idea what they are voting about and what is going on in the 
government. As we have seen in the previous chapter, publicity is one of the most important 
requirements for democracy. Of course there are certain areas where government secrecy should be 
allowed, but it is important to know what should and should not be kept secret. In this chapter we 
will first look at the notion of publicity in democracy, as described by Kant and Luban. Secondly we 
will look at different notions of governmental secrecy, namely the distinction between deep secrecy 
and shallow secrecy. After we have gained a better insight into different notions of secrecy, in the 
third part we will turn to how secrecy can be justified in a democracy. Following this, in the fourth 
part we will turn to lobbying, and how lobbying deals with these notions of governmental secrecy. 
We will find that lobbying can have a negative impact on governmental secrecy, leading to more 
secrets and making the democratic process less transparent. We will also consider secrecy in a 
democracy and how it relates to lobbying. In this chapter we will also explore the effects secretive 
lobbying has on democracy. 
 
Publicity in democracy 
One of the most important parts of democracy is the notion that citizens should be able to make 
informed decisions about their government. For the government and for politicians this means they 
are required to be open towards the public. When the government becomes so secretive that its 
citizens are unable to make informed decisions about their government, secrecy has gone too far; 
democracy requires publicity so citizens are able to make informed democratic decisions. The 
principle of publicity as described by Immanuel Kant can give an answer as to whether keeping a 
certain piece of governmental information secret is immoral or not. When the government asks itself 
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whether making something public will affect the public consensus, it in a certain sense asks whether 
the citizens would resist this policy because it is unjust. As Kant states: “All actions relating to the 
rights of others are wrong if their maxim is incompatible with publicity.”48 This means that if a certain 
action of the government could not be made public without invoking the anger of the general public, 
this action is not justified. According to Kant this has both an ethical side as well as a legal side; it 
should be a test for maxims that has ethical and juridical consequences.49 However, as it stands it is 
still merely a hypothetical test, it is a thought experiment. It is also limited. Although it shows when 
something is wrong when it cannot withstand publicity, this does not mean that the policy is 
therefore good.50 It serves only to show what is wrong in respect to others; it is a negative principle. 
Aside from this, the policy is not just a proposition of morality; it is also a principle of institutional 
design. This means it is a principle which should be taken into account for institutions of government.  
  In order for us to gain a deeper understanding of the publicity principle, we must ask 
ourselves exactly what we mean by publicity, and what it means for something to be incompatible 
with the principle of publicity. When it comes to publicity, David Luban has three interpretations of 
what Kant could have meant. Publicity as general knowledge, publicity as mutual knowledge, and 
publicity as critical debate.51 We might say that a certain piece of knowledge is public if everyone 
knows that piece of knowledge. Of course who we mean by everyone is limited as well. It does not 
mean absolutely everyone since there are some people who are so isolated that they would not 
normally gain certain knowledge. When Luban talks about general knowledge, he is describing the 
general public, and the knowledge they possess. It is important to note that for general knowledge it 
may be the case that people do not realise that other people have the same information as well, it 
may be a type of parallel private knowledge.52 We both know something, but we do not know that 
                                                          
48 Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 347. 
49 Ibid., 347. 
50 David Luban, “The Publicity Principle,” in The Theory of Institutional Design, ed. Robert E. Goodin, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 156. 
51 Ibid., 169. 
52 Ibid., 169-170. 
29 
 
the other person knows the same thing. On the other hand, when we have a certain type of 
information, and we know that other people have the same information, this can be regarded as 
mutual knowledge. Not only do we know something, another person knows the same thing and we 
know that he knows, and this person in turn knows that we know. This is a different type of publicity, 
although general knowledge can be mutual knowledge as well.53 The third type of publicity as 
described by Luban is the notion of critical debate. This is the idea that knowledge should be 
regarded critically in the public sphere; it is an idea proposed by Habermas. However, the idea of 
publicity as described by Kant is difficult to apply to the notion of critical debate. How can someone 
determine a priori whether a maxim is compatible with publicity if publicity is understood as rational 
public debate? One could try to anticipate the debate, but this is not the same as actually debating 
the issue. Kant meant for the publicity principle to provide an easy-to-use test of public policies for 
those who govern. Luban argues that this test is more difficult to apply to critical debate than the 
other forms of public knowledge.54 Luban therefore holds that mutual knowledge would be a better 
way of interpreting publicity and public knowledge.  
 It is also important to ask what it means for a maxim to be incompatible with publicity, that it 
cannot withstand publicity. Kant discusses two interpretations of incompatibility: a policy being self-
frustrating with publicity, and a policy arousing necessary and general opposition. Luban discusses 
two further possibilities: a policy being kept secret because it is unpopular, and a policy being kept 
secret because it is politically suicidal.55 It is relatively straightforward that a policy is incompatible 
with publicity when it is self-frustrating. This is the case when a policy cannot be declared openly 
without frustrating the intentions of the policy; it would defeat its own purpose if operated on public 
footing. According to Kant’s theory this means it is morally wrong.56 However, there are different 
ways in which a policy can be self-frustrating. A policy may be performatively inconsistent, self-
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defeating, or collaterally self-defeating. For example, a policy is performatively inconsistent if it has 
as its goal to mislead. An example of this would be what Luban calls a nuclear bluff, to threaten a 
foreign nation with a nuclear strike while not actually being prepared to carry that threat through.57 
Nuclear war would be one of the worst outcomes for everyone involved, so obviously most countries 
would do what they can to prevent it. Furthermore, it is not unthinkable that a country would never 
even use its weapons, but that it merely has them to threaten other countries, in order not to be 
outdone by another country that has nuclear power. Obviously if the other party knew that the 
threat would not be carried out it would not be an effective bluff. A self-defeating policy would do 
much the same, but in this case it would be a policy which would set a chain of events in motion 
which would eventually be self-frustrating. An example of this would be a policy where the 
institutions of justice have as their goal to stabilize society rather than to judge each individual fairly. 
This would mean that they do not treat every individual equally. However, if this were to be made 
open to the public, this would defeat the purpose of the policy.58 The third manner in which a policy 
would be self-frustrating is that it would be collaterally self-defeating if it were completely candid. 
This would be a policy which would not be directly frustrating, or even indirectly frustrating of itself, 
but frustrating of other some other related policy which in turn frustrates the original policy.59 An 
example of this would be a law that eventually causes a breakdown in the trust in the law, or in 
society itself in some form. Although the law itself is not frustrated directly, if the trust in the system 
of law is frustrated the law cannot be executed effectively anymore.  
  Aside from the notion that a policy can be self-frustrating Kant also writes about a maxim 
which cannot be publicly acknowledged without thereby inevitably arousing the resistance of 
everyone to the policy. By this it is meant that it can only have stirred up this necessary and general 
opposition against it because it is itself unjust. This seems straightforward as well; if a policy cannot 
be made open because everyone would oppose it, this policy is intrinsically loathsome and 
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undemocratic.60 The reason for this is that if it is clear that certain policies cannot be made public 
because the people would disagree with the policy if they had full knowledge, this would be at odds 
with our democratic ideals. This brings us to the third way in which a maxim can be incompatible 
with publicity. We cannot always know that a policy is necessarily and generally opposed; perhaps 
we should then turn to whether we can foresee that a policy will be extremely unpopular. It is clear 
that it would be easier to decide whether a policy would be unpopular than to decide whether a 
policy will be generally opposed. However, it is important to note that this is most likely not a 
principle of morality.61 The publicity test is not the same as a popularity contest. This makes it more 
difficult to decide whether a policy is justified or not, since as we have said, it is more difficult to 
decide whether a policy would actually be opposed rather than just be unpopular. Lastly we come to 
the idea of a policy being politically suicidal. Whether a maxim can withstand publicity can come 
down to the question whether a policy can withstand the political fallout that it generates. 
Frustration of citizens with the policy can mean backlash in the form of angry letters, but also 
impeachment or being forced to resign. These angry letters can come from citizens who feel that the 
policy does not abide by their wishes, but it can also come from people who feel that the 
government may be fundamentally threatening parts of the democracy. The more strongly the 
proposed policy differs from what citizens feel that the direction of the government should be, the 
stronger the backlash would be. As has been said, it could even mean that a politician is forced to 
resign. However, the idea of a certain policy being incompatible with publicity because it is politically 
suicidal is problematic. It presupposes that a politician actually cares about the public opinion and 
abides by it. But a politician can also maintain a very tough stance and simply choose not to step 
down. The politician simply does not abide by the public opinion even if his policy is in fact 
incompatible with publicity. Therefore this interpretation of incompatibility with publicity does not 
hold up to scrutiny.62  
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  Now that we have an understanding of the principle of publicity, it is important to find out 
whether and when the principle of publicity may be justly violated. Respecting the principle of 
publicity is not always the best option, neither morally nor politically. An example of a moral reason 
not to maintain the publicity principle would be in cases of mercy. For example: a court may let a 
perpetrator go because the accused has succumbed to very human flaws, in other words because no 
man is perfect. This is generally inconsistent with publicity. When it becomes publicly known that 
courts allow prisoners to go back to society unpunished this presents a hefty problem for the 
deterrence of criminal activity. Obviously if there is no punishment in certain cases it would be more 
difficult to deter potential criminals from committing crimes, which is why it would not hold up to the 
publicity principle. Another more practical example which was mentioned by Luban is the sunsetting 
of certain policies. When certain policies are about to be discontinued, it can be problematic if 
everyone knows that the sunsetting is going to happen. For example, the introduction of more 
restrictive gun control could lead to a run on certain weapons if the government announced when 
the ban on certain weapons would be set in place.63 Although most governments would indeed 
announce this ban, there is certainly ample reason to keep the date of the ban a secret. Another 
practical example would be the fact that in the cold war the USSR and the United States would allow 
the other to fly spy planes in their air space. They did not announce this fact to the public, since an 
official announcement would force them to take a stance against the other. If they indeed made a 
stance it is possible that the conflict would only escalate. Since the other government did not 
publicize its flights it was possible to keep the policy of tolerating the other’s spy planes a secret.64  
  Publicity remains a very important part of democracy; it allows people to make informed 
decisions about their government. The principle of publicity can also give us insight in how we should 
deal with governmental secrets. As we have seen, there can be various legitimate reasons why a 
policy is being kept secret, but if a policy is secret this can mean that certain checks and balances do 
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not work quite as effectively. Now that we have a better understanding of publicity, we will turn 
towards the notion of secrecy.  
 
Deep secrecy and shallow secrecy 
Another way of looking at government secrecy and the nature of secrecy itself as well as its problems 
is by using the notions of deep secrecy and shallow secrecy, as posited by David Pozen. As he states, 
there are things we know we know about the government, things we know we do not know, and 
things we do not know we do not know.65 In other words, there are things which we have knowledge 
of, there are secrets which we are aware of, and there are secrets which we do not even know exist. 
The latter category is what he calls deep secrets. Deep secrecy is the kind of secrecy where we do not 
even know that there is something being kept from the public by the government. If we do not even 
know what is being held from us, we have no means to judge whether we agree with the policies of 
the government. This is clearly a case where the idea of publicity is not being used. There are 
different interpretations of the notion of deep secrecy. As Scheppele puts it: Secrets are items of 
information that one party, the ‘secret-keeper’, intentionally conceals from another party, the 
‘target’. Sometimes the target of a secret knows or suspects that information is being concealed, 
even though this person does not know the content of the information. This can be called a shallow 
secret. Other times the target of a secret is not aware, and has no reason to be aware, that 
something is being kept from her. This is a deep secret, according to the definition of Scheppele.66 
Shallow secrets in other words would be secrets we do now exist, we just do not know the exact 
content of the secret. 
  According to Pozen, deep secrecy is problematic on utilitarian, democratic and constitutional 
grounds.67 For the purposes of this essay we will focus on democratic arguments against deep 
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secrecy, although these are quite similar to the utilitarian arguments against state secrecy. It is clear 
that deep secrecy exacerbates problems of secrecy in democracy. It keeps outsiders of the secret 
more ignorant, and the secret keeper has more room to pursue impermissible or inappropriate ends 
through impermissible and inappropriate means. But it also erodes checks and balances; Parliament 
and the judiciary may never receive vital information necessary in order to keep certain things in 
check. By keeping the activities of the state a secret, the ability of the people and of the people’s 
representatives to monitor and judge the activities of the government is severely reduced.68 It is also 
hard to see how deep secrecy can be justified in a liberal democracy. A democratic defence of 
secrecy may rely on hypothetical consent. This becomes difficult for deep secrets since gauging the 
public sentiment becomes more difficult when secrets become deeper. This does not suggest that 
government policies must always be under public control. It might even be impossible for people to 
allow the government to do something which undermines the very idea of self-rule. The very idea of 
democracy is that the people are in control of the actions of the government to a certain extent. 
There has to be a way for the population to judge the decisions of the government, and if a 
government were to ask permission for deep secrecy it would make this impossible. The reason for 
this is that the government is in effect asking for permission for something which the population 
cannot know. How can the population then give permission? Surely it is a prerequisite that we know 
what we are deciding on before we can make a democratic decision. This is why it is problematic for 
a democracy to have too much secrecy.  
 
Justification of secrecy 
However, some democratic policies require secrecy in order to be effective. Various secret 
operations in foreign countries spring to mind, where the safety of covert agents is dependent on 
secrecy. Another example where secrecy is acceptable would be the possibility of the moderation of 
secrecy, to give some information to allow democratic accountability without revealing too much. In 
                                                          
68 Ibid., 286. 
35 
 
this case there should be enough publicity about the policy so that citizens can judge whether there 
is enough publicity, and that they agree with the policy.69  
  Thompson identifies three cases where it is necessary to keep the policy a secret for its 
effectiveness. The first is the case of excuses and non-enforcement of punishments. For example, 
although a politician would want to enact tougher measures on crime, there might not be enough 
institutional support to carry out these measures. The politician could then act as if he has taken a 
tougher stand, even though people are not actually getting harsher punishments. The reason that 
this secret would be justified would become clear that the harsher punishment is indeed not 
enforced, the effectiveness of the judicial system would diminish. In other words, the discrepancy 
between what the law says and how it is enforced is normally at least partially secret.70  
The second kind of case where a principle of transparency might not be maintained is compelled 
silence. This is a step further than the previously discussed non-enforcement. Here the law explicitly 
requires that the practice be kept a secret, and the prohibited conduct becomes illegal only if it is 
revealed. An example of this would be the so called ‘don’t ask don’t tell’ regulations in the US army. 
This policy, although now discontinued, entailed that gay men and women could serve in the US 
military as long as they did not reveal their sexuality to anyone. Before this policy was implemented 
gay men and women were not allowed to serve in the US military at all. When the policy was still in 
effect gay men and women could be fired from their job when they revealed their sexuality, so it was 
indeed only effective when kept a secret. It is important to note that the policy is not vulnerable to 
the objection that it breaches democratic accountability. Generally this kind of policy would mean 
that there would be no chance to vote on the policy. This was not the case in the ‘don’t ask don’t tell’ 
policy, in fact there was a lot of discussion about its implementation. This means that people indeed 
were able to make an informed decision about the policy.71 The third and final case where 
transparency may be transgressed is the notion of political hypocrisy. When a politician is 
                                                          
69 Dennis F. Thompson, “Democratic Secrecy,” Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 2 (1999), 183. 
70 Ibid., 186, 188. 
71 Ibid., 189-190. 
36 
 
campaigning for a certain policy which he personally does not abide by, for example soliciting 
prostitutes while making prostitution illegal, the focus becomes more on his person rather than his 
policies. This hurts the democratic process, which is why it is acceptable to keep this a secret as 
well.72 The ideas proposed by Thompson are closely related to the notion of shallow secrecy.  
 
Lobbying and governmental secrecy 
With the knowledge of publicity and secrecy, we can turn to the role of lobbying in publicity and 
secrecy, and what this means for democracy. We have found that there are two reasons why 
lobbying can be negative for democracy. The first reason is that lobbying can lead to a lack of 
transparency. As we have seen, one of the accusations made in the hearing of the European 
Parliament on lobbying was that lobbying lacks transparency. This would mean that competitors, the 
mass media, and officials would find it harder to effectively carry out their work.73 If lobbying is done 
secretly this indeed constitutes a problem for democracy. Not only can lobbying lead to a lack of 
transparency in the government, it can also lead to one-sided lobbying. This is the second reason 
lobbying can be negative for democracy. One-sided lobbying means that politicians do not talk to 
different sides that are trying to influence them, they are only getting information from a single 
party, this can be called niche lobbying. The reason for this is that some parties may not even know 
that other parties are influencing policy makers. If some parties do not even have this information 
they cannot provide policy makers with other information, so the policy maker gets a very one-sided 
view of the situation.  
  The first reason lobbying can be negative for democracy is because lobbying can lead to a 
lack of transparency. As the critical side of the European Parliament stated, lobbying takes place 
behind closed doors where competitors, the mass media, and officials cannot gain insight in what 
exactly is happening. It is an important pillar of democracy that people are able to make decisions 
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about the government and vote for certain parties based on the information presented to them. In 
fact, publicity is one of the requirements of democracy I mentioned in the first chapter. If the mass 
media cannot gain certain information this undermines an important part of democracy, namely a 
measure of publicity. There is no specific reason why it could not be generally known what lobbyists 
do and how politicians are influenced by them. Indeed, this could only be the case if there were 
certain things that go on that are not compatible with publicity. If it becomes clear that certain 
politicians are indeed being influenced by lobbyists in such a manner that they forego their 
responsibility as representatives, this means that lobbying can have a very negative impact on 
democracy. There are of course certain secrets that can be justified in a democracy, but most 
instances of lobbying would not fall into this category of justified secrets.  
  The second aspect of lobbying which can be negative for democracy is the phenomenon of 
niche lobbying without counter-lobbying, as described by Cohen-Eliya and Hammer.74 Cohen-Eliya 
and Hammer described this phenomenon as follows. “Lobbying often occurs in niches with almost no 
involvement of the public and almost no rivalry. This constitutes a failure in the democratic process 
from the perspective of the pluralistic theory, for it is exactly in those niches that rent-seeking 
lobbying succeeds.”75 By “pluralistic theory” Cohen-Eliya and Hammer mean a theory of democracy 
where interest groups struggle to realize their interests.76 By rent-seeking is meant increasing one’s 
influence without actually having a proper reason to have more influence. This is of course 
reminiscent of the accusations made by the European Parliament to lobbying which we mentioned 
previously. What this entails is that if certain interest groups have more information than others, 
they can talk to representatives to try to influence them. If only one group talks to politicians, this 
obviously means that other groups cannot have their view on the subject heard. This in turn means 
that a politician only gets one side of the information on a certain debate, whereas a politician 
should try to hear out as many sides as possible in a conflict. In other words, because of niche-
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lobbying it becomes more difficult for a politician to make a balanced decision based on multiple 
sources of information. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have seen that lobbying can have a negative impact on democracy by creating 
more secrecy. We have also seen that a transparent government is required for democracy, and that 
publicity is an important part of governmental policy. Citizens should be able to make an informed 
decision about their government; this requires a measure of publicity. But publicity can be 
interpreted in different ways. Kant holds that publicity is the measure for ethical actions of the 
government. There are of course also different interpretations as to what Kant exactly meant by 
publicity, whether he understood it as general knowledge, mutual knowledge, or critical debate. 
There are also different ways a policy can be incompatible with publicity. We have discussed a policy 
being self-frustrating with publicity, a policy arousing general opposition, a policy being unpopular, 
and a policy being kept secret because it is politically suicidal. If a policy is indeed frustrated by 
publicity this would mean the policy is not ethical. However, this is formulated somewhat too simply. 
There are some practical examples where the principle of publicity may be violated. This ties in to the 
idea of democratic secrets. If democratic secrets are in fact allowed, to what extent can they be 
allowed? Although governmental secrecy can be justified, it is only in specific cases that it can be 
justified. We know of certain secrets which are allowed, but we have found that deep secrecy, a 
secret which we do not even know exists, is problematic on democratic grounds. Lobbying ties in 
with our discussion of secrecy and publicity. Lobbying can have an exacerbating impact on 
democratic secrecy, as it can lead to more secrecy and difficulties in the democratic process by 
making political processes less public. It can also have other negative influences, by creating a system 
where lobbyists can influence a politician on their own, rather than a politician being influenced by 
multiple lobbies. Although there are many negative aspects of lobbying in democracy, there are of 
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course also certain positive aspects of lobbying for democracy. We will discuss these aspects in the 
next chapter.   
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Chapter 3: positive aspects of lobbying 
Introduction  
In the previous chapters we have seen the negative sides of lobbying and the problems that can be 
created by lobbying. However, this does not do justice to the positive side of lobbying. As we will see 
in this chapter, lobbying can have a very positive effect on democracy, the requirements of 
democracy, and the government in general. In the past chapters we have seen that there are 
important factors in a democracy which can contribute to a better government, or a government 
which is more reflective of the will of the population. Lobbying can have a positive effect on some of 
these important aspects of democracy. Firstly, lobbying can have a positive effect on the exchange of 
information therefore letting politicians make better decisions. The reason for this is that lobbying 
allows for politicians to solicit information from organized groups so decisions can be made more 
effectively. Secondly, lobbying can increase participation by citizens, which means that citizens can 
have a more active role in the decision-making process. Thirdly, it can help in a better representation 
of the population. This is connected in part to increased participation. The reason for this is that 
better representation can also be achieved through more active participation. If citizens participate 
more, this also means that people are represented in a better way. Finally, lobbying can have a 
positive influence on publicity in democracy. Lobbying can ensure that certain information is brought 
out into the open. The reason for this is that lobbying itself requires publicity to an extent. In this 
chapter I will discuss how lobbying can help these aspects of democracy. 
 
Important aspects of democracy 
The outside influence of certain groups on politicians, normally known as lobbying, can be beneficial 
to the government, to the democratic process, and even democratic legitimacy. Lobbying can be 
seen as a sign of the ongoing improvement in a democratic society, with interests competing with 
each other. It can thus be argued that when lobbies try to influence political decision-making, this is a 
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symbol of democracy in good working order.77 Many politicians would argue that a lobby of some 
description is necessary in a democracy. As we have seen there are different theories of how a 
democracy should be designed, but the different theories still share a number of requirements that 
should be met. It is important to take another look at these requirements so that we understand 
whether lobbying can have a positive influence on them. The first requirement is participation, 
meaning that citizens have an active part in the political process. This often takes the form of the 
right to vote, since this an easy way for the people to let their voices be heard. The second 
requirement is freedom of speech and freedom of press. The third requirement is publicity of the 
government, the government needs to be open about their affairs. The reason for this is that it is 
necessary in a democracy that people can form an opinion of their government. In order for this to 
be possible there has to be enough information so that the citizens can make a judgment. The fourth 
and final requirement is accountability of the politician to the public. We will find that both 
participation and publicity can benefit from lobbying.  
 
Effectiveness of policies 
When trying to understand the positive aspects of democracy, it is important to have a good 
understanding of how lobbying works. There have been theories which postulate that the best way 
to conceive the relationship between politicians and lobbyists is one of an exchange relationship 
between two groups of interdependent organizations.78 Lobbyists exchange information with policy 
makers, for example in the form of expert knowledge from private actors.79 The first reason why 
lobbying can be positive in a democracy is because it can provide additional information to 
politicians. Many lobby groups will be called by politicians for additional knowledge, or more 
specialised knowledge. Many lobby groups can have more influence if they are seen as experts in 
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certain areas. Political decisions are based on information from society. The political system should 
seek to integrate as many interests as accurately as possible in its decision-making. The input of 
lobbyists can help solve problems of decision-making by providing information.80 Lobbyists aggregate 
detailed expertise and specialised knowledge concerning their demands, which the decision-makers 
need to carry out their work. The effectiveness of lobbying correlates strongly with the usefulness of 
the information and its potential for simplifying the decision-makers’ task. The interaction between a 
lobbyist and a decision-maker is the result of the lobbyist’s intention to influence. The decision-
maker then has to accept the information communicated to him, as well as the communicating 
source. Knowing this, lobbyists strive to offer specific benefits to the decision-maker.81 There can be 
different ways to exchange information with regard to politics. Large companies have enough means 
to research, and often have a well-funded R&D division. This enables them to provide expert 
knowledge to policy makers.82 If a company is large enough it can even give policy makers 
information regarding the interests of the company. For a very large company the national interests 
may very well be in line with the interests of the company. For many political institutions the 
information provided may also give valuable input as to how they can reduce the democratic deficit 
and increase legitimacy. For example, the European Union.83 From this it is clear that lobbying can be 
used to improve democratic institutions, but lobbying mostly helps the government because it 
provides a service so the government can function more effectively. This form of lobbying, the 
exchange of information, may thus be justifiable more from the reasoning that this leads to a better 
government than that it provides a better democracy.  
 
Participation and representation 
As I have mentioned the second reason why lobbying can be positive for democracy is because it can 
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be seen as a form of political participation. The third reason why lobbying can be positive for 
democracy is because it can increase political representation. This is closely related to participation, 
which we have discussed previously. We have defined lobbying as outside influence on politicians. 
When it becomes clear that citizens can influence their politicians through a form of lobbying, 
citizens can participate in democracy and influence decision-making. For example, a citizen might join 
or support a group which advocates environmental protection because he feels that the current 
government is not paying enough attention to this. Practically any citizen can either join a group to 
promote his interests and increase their participation or make a group themselves. This is of course 
beneficial for democratic legitimacy because more people are actively involved in political decisions 
by having their voice heard. This in turn means that politicians would find it easier to represent 
people accordingly. This means that lobbying can play an important part in legitimacy and in 
compliance. Governance should take place by involving citizens and interest groups as much as 
possible in the decision-making process and its control. This can be done through the exchange of 
information between lobby groups to politicians.  
  Making sure that more parties are part of the exchange of information and more parties 
participate in the decision-making process can also help in representation in a democracy. Lobbying 
can thus be justified because it helps in achieving equal representation, thus reducing the problem of 
some people being better represented than others. Through lobbying anyone can make himself 
heard by a politician if he can organize himself, and groups that may be underrepresented in the 
political sphere can now have their voices heard by politicians. For example, if a group of farmers 
feels the government is not representing their interests as it should, the farmers can organize 
themselves in such a way that their interests are heard by the government. They could organize 
themselves and talk to the politicians to explain their interests. If the farmers feel they are not 
represented properly, they can do something about it.  
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Lobbying influence on secrecy 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, lobbying can lead to more secrecy in the government. But 
on the other hand, a number of problems can be created for lobbying when the government 
becomes too secretive as well. By this it is meant that when a democracy is too secretive, and does 
not want to let its citizens weigh in on decisions and does not disclose how decisions are made, it 
becomes a lot more difficult for a lobbyist to influence politicians. As we have seen, lobbyists are not 
always a negative factor in a democracy, lobbying can have beneficial effects on democracy as well as 
the democratic process. One might even argue that democracy requires a form of lobbying, even if it 
is only for citizens and companies to make their voices heard more actively. If a democracy is truly 
secretive in its decision-making this would mean that lobbying cannot work. This means it would 
make sense for lobbyists to argue for more openness in certain parts of the government, so that they 
can do their work properly. We have seen this being done in our discussion of the Freedom of 
Information Act. Here lobbyists supported the enactment of a law such as this, so that more 
openness would be required for the government. If lobbyists are more successful in their attempts to 
create more publicity in government, this is obviously very positive for democracy, as it is one of the 
requirements for democracy mentioned in chapter 1. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have discussed positive effects of lobbying on democracy. The first reason why 
lobbying can be positive for democracy is because it helps the effective functioning of a government. 
A government always requires certain input from the population to make sure policies are effective, 
and to increase their effectiveness. Politicians require expert opinions in order to predict whether 
their policies are going to be effective, which is a very valuable aspect of lobbying. Secondly, lobbying 
allows the population to participate in democracy. If a person wants to have their voice heard, a very 
effective way is to do this through lobbying. This means that, thirdly, representation can be improved 
a lot since it becomes easier for a politician to determine how to best represent the population. If a 
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person does indeed have their voice heard in politics, this is clearly a positive sign for representation. 
The final reason why lobbying can be positive for democracy is because it can help to make 
information more public. Publicity is an essential requirement for democracy, but it is also a 
requirement for lobbying. So it would make sense for lobbyists to lobby for more publicity, which is 
what happened in the creation of the Freedom of Information Act. In a democracy it is important 
that certain values are upheld. We have discussed various of these important values, or 
requirements of democracy in previous chapters. Lobbying is often seen as negative for a democracy, 
but in this chapter we have seen that lobbying can also be very positive for these requirements. 
Especially when we look at the requirements of participation and publicity lobbying can have a very 
positive effect. In the next chapter we will look at how problems of lobbying can be solved, while 
trying not to undermine the positive aspects of lobbying. 
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Chapter 4: Possible ways forward to a lobby in line with our democratic ideals.  
Introduction 
We now have an understanding of democracy, an understanding of what role lobbying plays in 
democracy, what effects of lobbying can have on democracy, as well as an image of the problems 
which can be created by lobbying. And as we have seen, lobbying is not necessarily a negative thing. 
However, lobbying can have very negative effects on democracy. We will now try to find solutions to 
the problems and move towards a more democratic way of organizing lobbying. The problems of 
lobbying might be solved by restricting lobbying, in other words by ensuring that lobbyists cannot 
influence politicians as much. Perhaps this would in fact solve some problems. However, this would 
also undermine the positive aspects of lobbying. If the positive aspects of lobbying are to remain 
intact there cannot be too strict control of lobbying. One of the strong aspects of lobbying is that it 
allows citizens to contribute more actively in a democracy. It is important that this is not undermined 
when one tries to find solutions to the problems of lobbying. In this final chapter I will discuss in what 
possible ways we can improve democracy and lobbying in such a way that it leaves the positive 
aspects of lobbying intact. The first way in which lobbying can be improved is by simply making the 
government more transparent. Many of the negative aspects that are caused by lobbying are in fact 
caused by an opaque government which does not allow certain information to be made public. An 
important way in which the government might be made more transparent is by creating a mandatory 
lobby register. This makes sure that a certain amount of publicity is maintained by the government. 
Another way of solving the problems of lobbying can be found by looking at a different way of 
organizing democracy. Many aspects of lobbying that are problematic in representative democracy 
are not as problematic in deliberative democracy. In this chapter we will explore these different 
solutions to the problems of lobbying.  
 
Increased publicity of the government 
Many problems related to the imbalances of democracy caused by lobbying come down to a lack of 
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publicity. This can either be a lack of publicity from the government, but also from lobbying. If 
lobbyists ensured there was more publicity in the way they lobby not only would there be no niche 
lobbying where certain interest groups have no knowledge of other interest groups, there would also 
be no way the general population does not know what lobbyists are doing. So not only is publicity 
essential for democracy, it is also necessary for the accountability of politicians. It can also be used to 
solve other problems related to lobbying.  
  A major problem of the way lobbying is usually organized is the fact that some players with 
more means can organize themselves better than other players with less means. For instance, there 
is a lobby of big corporations which has more influence when compared to groups with smaller 
means, even though big corporations usually already play a big part in politics. This means that 
smaller groups or groups which cannot organize themselves quite so effectively are effectively shut 
down in a democracy. The bigger groups with more means can overpower them. One way to combat 
this is by turning towards the politicians. It is up to the politician to decide what to do when it comes 
to difficult decisions in the democratic process. As has been said, it is the responsibility of the 
politician to make decisions as a representative. If a politician does not act as a representative he is 
not fulfilling his role as a politician properly. Of course there are different ways one might represent 
the electorate, but a politician should always keep in mind that he is not acting on his own interests 
but on the interests of the people he is representing. Although he may be influenced by numerous 
parties which all have their own interests, the politician should weigh the interests of various parties 
and come to a decision how to best represent the people. If we expect a politician to make balanced 
decisions which are democratically feasible we must have the means to check whether his decisions 
are in fact democratic enough. The politician should be held accountable for his decisions and the 
effect these decisions have on the public. Prerequisite for checking the responsibility of politicians is 
a certain measure of publicity and a system where the politician can be held accountable. If there is 
no feedback to the politician for his actions and his policies a fundamental part of democracy is 
undermined. This feedback can take the form of impeachment for instance, or not begin re-elected. 
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It is obvious that for the feedback to be effective there would need to be enough publicity so that 
citizens can judge whether a politician is in fact doing his job properly. In other words, publicity and 
accountability are essential for democracy.  
  Although publicity does not focus on the associated problems of lobbying as mentioned in 
chapter 1, it is still worth mentioning that publicity also works to tackle these problems. After all, if a 
government provides more information on how political decisions are made and policy is decided, it 
becomes more difficult for politicians to take bribes, and more difficult for lobbyist to bully or 
threaten politicians. The reason for this is that politicians would be forced to explain their decisions 
in detail, and they could not give reasons that relate to personal corruption. The same goes for 
campaign financing. There are different ways a government might provide publicity, but if one uses 
the publicity principle as we defined it before it would be relevant to disclose information 
surrounding public campaign financing. If this information is disclosed this would solve many of the 
problems surrounding public campaign financing as well. It would be more difficult for politicians to 
make decisions solely based on where the money for their campaign is coming from. If this were the 
case the public could hold the politician accountable for their possibly corrupt decisions.  
 One way a government can make itself more public is be enacting a mandatory lobby 
register. A lobby register is a way to ensure that lobbying becomes more transparent. It ensures that 
it is clear who is lobbying, what they are lobbying for, how much is spent on lobbying, and it can 
make it easier to penalise lobbyists who do not abide by lobbying regulations. Not only can this 
increase transparency, it can help accountability as well.84 A lobby register can help in another way 
because unlawful lobbying practices would be harder to conceal. Lobbyists might be too scared to 
actively blackmail a politician if they can be held accountable, because they are registered as a 
lobbyist. In other words, this solution helps against practices done by lobbyists, which are in fact not 
acts of lobbying strictly speaking.  
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Deliberative democracy 
A different way to tackle the problems of lobbying can be found by looking at a different type of 
organizing democracy. As we have seen, lobbying can have a negative influence on the balance of 
interests, but this can be improved by turning towards deliberative democracy. In deliberative 
democracy we find many important aspects which can help with the problems of lobbying. According 
to Gutmann and Thompson important aspects of deliberation include reciprocity, publicity, and 
accountability. Reciprocity is important because of the way citizens can cooperate. If citizens can 
reason reciprocally, they are looking for ways of resolving moral disagreements in such a way that is 
acceptable for both parties.85 This is an essential part of deliberation. If reciprocity is not accepted by 
both parties the very aspect of deliberation could not lead to a solution of conflict. People need to 
reason beyond their narrow self-interest and towards a morally acceptable solution if certain 
problems are to be resolved.86 Publicity is another aspect which is essential for deliberation in a 
democracy. After all, the population needs to know what they are deliberating about if there is to be 
meaningful deliberation in a deliberative democracy. Publicity is also a requirement for 
accountability, because there would be no way that someone could be held accountable if it were 
simply not known exactly what he had done. These aspects of deliberative democracy can help in 
lobbying because if these principles are upheld, various problems of lobbying would be minimized.  
  The problem of democratic imbalance would weigh far less heavy on the decisions in a 
deliberative democracy as proposed by Gutmann and Thompson. Democratic imbalance is caused by 
the fact that bigger players in lobbying can organize themselves more effectively and thus influence 
politicians more. But in a deliberative democracy the very idea of deliberation makes this more 
difficult. In a deliberative democracy the principle of reciprocity makes sure that everyone has to 
take one another’s interests into account, and the goal of deliberation is always that a solution is 
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reached which is acceptable for all. This means that public influence of big corporations by lobbyists 
is made more difficult since they would have to present their arguments in such a way that is 
acceptable to all. Everyone would have a say in the deliberative procedure and everyone would have 
the ability to speak up and declare that certain interests are not being taken into account enough. 
This makes sure that the problem of interests which are not equally represented is far less of a 
problem.  
  The other problem of lobbying, namely that it can lead to more secrecy, is also less 
problematic in the actual implementation of deliberative democracy. If the ideals of a deliberative 
democracy are put into place, this would require a good amount of publicity. It is a requirement for 
deliberation that everyone knows what they are deliberating about. So if deliberative democracy is 
put into place and everyone accepts the values of deliberative democracy, the actual problems of 
secrecy would prove far less poignant.  
 
Conclusion 
In this final chapter the various different parts of previous chapters have come into play once more. 
As we have seen in chapter 1 and 2 lobbying can create various problems for democracy. Lobbying 
can have as its effect a less democratic society, or a more secret government. These are both 
obviously very negative for society as well as democratic legitimacy. However, we have also seen that 
lobbying can have a very positive effect on democracy. Lobbying can lead to better decisions by the 
government, better representation, and a society in which citizens participate more actively in the 
decision-making process. In this chapter I have presented methods in which the problems of lobbying 
can be tackled without disrupting the positive aspects of lobbying. In order to do this, I first looked at 
how publicity in the government can be used to improve lobbying. This can either be done through a 
lobby register. This has as its effect improved accountability and a more democratic government. It 
also undermines problems of personal corruption by providing more publicity. After all, if a politician 
has to give information regarding their policies and the implementation of these policies it would be 
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more difficult to succumb to things like bullying or corruption. Another way one might improve 
democracy is by turning towards deliberative democracy. We have discussed the theory of 
deliberative democracy as and the important aspects as posited by Gutmann and Thompson. In 
deliberative democracy publicity is a very important aspect in the democratic process. It is required 
that people discuss policy with politicians and with other citizens. It is thus a prerequisite that most 
information surrounding the government is open to the public, solving various problems of lobbying.  
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Conclusion 
In this thesis I have answered the question what kind of influence organized interest groups, 
commonly known as lobbyists, have on democracy and therefore on democratic legitimacy. It is 
important to understand what kind of influence non-elected groups have on democracy. To gain a 
better understanding I have looked at lobbying from a philosophical perspective. As I have shown, 
there are vastly different facets of lobbying which all do vastly different things to democracy. 
Lobbying can have very negative effects by leading to democratic imbalance and adding more 
secrecy to a government. However, it can also have a very positive effect on democracy. It can make 
sure people’s voices are heard by offering more chances for participation in the democratic process. 
It can also help the government by allowing experts to give their opinion of policy. I have argued that 
although lobbying has negative aspects, it cannot simply be dismissed as it also has important 
positive elements for democracy.  
  In order to answer what kind of influence lobbying has on democracy I started by discussing 
different types of democracy. Two of the most influential forms of democracy are representative 
democracy and deliberative democracy. Representative democracy is a theory of democracy where 
our interests are represented by politicians. We have looked at the theory of representation of Nadia 
Urbinati and Mark Warren, as well how representation is understood by Hanna Pitkin. I have also 
discussed deliberative democracy, where the focus lies on the deliberation between politicians and 
citizens. There are different theories of deliberative democracy as well. I have discussed the theories 
of Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson and the theory of Joshua Cohen. Whereas Gutmann and 
Thompson formulated a theory which is based more on the deliberation between citizens and the 
government, Cohen formulated a theory which was focussed more on the procedure of deliberation. 
However, both of these theories give us a good insight into how a deliberative democracy can take 
shape. After having discussed both representative democracy and deliberative democracy we can 
turn to the requirements of democracy. There are aspects of democracy which are required to 
ensure a form of democratic government regardless of which theory is maintained. These aspects 
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include: participation of the people in government, freedom of speech, publicity of the government, 
and accountability of the government to the citizens. These aspects provide a good basis to judge 
whether lobbying can be positive or negative for democracy. In order to come to a deeper 
understanding of the risks of lobbying we also discussed lobbying is and what lobbying certainly is 
not. Finally, we discussed the first problem of lobbying, namely that it can lead to an imbalance in 
representation and thus an imbalance in democracy. 
  In the next chapter I discussed a different problem of lobbying. The problem is that lobbying 
can lead to more secrecy in government. This can be problematic because it undermines some of the 
requirements for democracy, namely publicity and accountability. To explain this in further detail I 
discussed the notion of publicity as understood by Kant and explored by David Luban. This theory 
explains when a certain piece of information should be made public, and when it cannot be kept 
from the public. Another important aspect is the notion of governmental secrecy. In order to better 
understand this I also explored the notion of deep secrecy and shallow secrecy as understood by 
David Pozen. Although there are reasons why certain things may be kept secret, these reasons 
usually do not apply to acts of lobbying.  
  But as I have mentioned there are certainly positive aspects of lobbying for democracy. 
Lobbying allows for information requests by the government so that experts can give their opinions 
on policies. This can obviously lead to better policies and a more effective government. But it can 
also provide information for the politicians how their constituents feel about certain policies. This in 
turn allows for better representation. It also allows for better representation by giving citizens the 
means to organize themselves and directly influence politicians by providing information from their 
perspective. Finally, another positive aspect is the fact that lobbying can lead to less secrecy. This 
may seem paradoxical because lobbying can also lead to more secrecy. But as we have seen, lobbying 
itself cannot function without a certain measure of publicity. It is therefore in the interest of lobbyists 
themselves that they maintain a certain amount of publicity, and try to persuade the government 
that more publicity is in the general interest. 
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  In the final chapter I have attempted to come to an answer how we can deal with lobbying in 
such a way that the positive aspects remain, while tackling the problems of lobbying. In other words, 
a solution should deal with unequal representation and secrecy in democracy while allowing the 
government to call in experts and allow groups to provide them with information. The answer how 
this can be done comes back to the notion of publicity as discussed in chapter 2 and deliberative 
democracy as discussed in chapter 1. More publicity ensures that it becomes more difficult for 
lobbyists to influence politicians secretly, and with means that we would argue are negative for 
democracy. This solution exposes negative parts of democracy and lobbying and allows for better 
accountability of the government. This can be done in many different ways. An example would be by 
enacting a mandatory lobby register where it is registered who lobbies for what, and which politician 
is being approached by lobbyists. A different solution is to turn towards deliberative democracy. Not 
only does this lead to more publicity, since this is a prerequisite for deliberative democracy, it also 
allows for more direct influence of the population. This means that both the problems of democratic 
secrecy and democratic imbalance are tackled, since the entire population can deliberate. This brings 
us to the final conclusion of this thesis. Lobbying can be both positive and negative. Lobbying can 
undermine democracy and strengthen democracy, but it is up to the responsibility of the citizens and 
the politicians to ensure that the positives outweigh the negatives. Understanding democracy and 
understanding the philosophy behind it can help in this task, and we should take the opportunity to 
use philosophy in order to help us tackle the problems of lobbying.  
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Klüver, Heike. Lobbying in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
Koeppl, Peter. “The Acceptance, relevance and dominance of lobbying the EU Commission – A First- 
 time Survey of the EU Commission’s Civil Servants.” Journal of Public Affairs 1, no. 1 (January  
 2000). doi: 10.1002/pa.51. 
Luban, David. “The Publicity Principle.” in The Theory of Institutional Design, edited by Robert E.  
 Goodin. Cambrige: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
Pitkin, Hanna. The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. 
Pozen, David E. “Deep Secrecy.” Stanford Law Review 62, no. 2 (2010). 
Relly, Jeannine E. and Carol B. Schwalbe. “How business lobby networks shaped the U.S. Freedom of  
 Information Act: An examination of 60 years of congressional testimony.” Government  
 Information Quarterly 33 no. 3 (July 2016). doi: 10.1016/j.giq.2016.05.002. 
Schendelen, Rinus van. Machiavelli in Brussels: The Art of Lobbying the EU. Amsterdam: Amsterdam  
 University Press, 2002. 
Scheppele, Kim Lane. Legal Secrets: Equality and Efficiency in The Common Law. Chicago: University 
  of Chicago Press, 1988. 
Thompson, Dennis F. “Democratic Secrecy.” Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 2 (1999). 
Urbinati, Nadia, and Mark E. Warren. “The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic  
 Theory.” Annual Review of Political Science 11, no. 1 (2008): 387-412. doi:  
 10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053006.190533. 
Zeigler, Harmon and Michael A. Baer. Lobbying: interaction and influence in American state  
 legislatures. Belmont California: Wadsworth publishing company Inc., 1969. 
